We give an overview of issues surrounding computer-verified theorem proving in the standard pure-mathematical context. This includes the basic reasons why it should be interesting to pure mathematicians, some history, natural desiderata for a useful system, viewpoints on what kind of logic to use, a short explanation of how things work, an overview of different options for encoding sets, and perspectives on future developments.
Introduction
When I was taking Wilfried Schmid's class on variations of Hodge structure, he came in one day and said "ok, today we're going to calculate the sign of the curvature of the classifying space in the horizontal directions". This is, of course, the key point in the whole theory: the negative curvature in these directions leads to all sorts of important things such as the distance decreasing property.
So Wilfried started out the calculation, and when he came to the end of the first double-blackboard, he took the answer at the bottom right and recopied it at the upper left, then stood back and said "lets verify what's written down before we erase it". Verification made (and eventually, sign changed) he erased the board and started anew. Four or five double blackboards later, we got to the answer. It was negative.
Proof is the fundamental concept underlying mathematical research. In the exploratory mode, it is the main tool by which we percieve the mathematical world as it really is rather than as we would like it to be. Inventively, proof is used for validation of ideas: one uses them to prove something nontrivial, which is valid only if the proof is correct. Other methods of validation exist, for example showing that an idea leads to computational predictions -but they often generate proof obligations too. Unfortunately, the need to prove things is the factor which slows us down the most too.
It has recently become possible, and also necessary, to imagine a full-fledged machine-verification system for mathematical proof. This might radically change many aspects of mathematical research -for better or for worse is a matter of opinion. At such a juncture it is crucial that standard pure mathematicians participate.
This Letter is intended to supply a synthetic contribution to the subject. Most, or probably all, is not anything new (and I take this opportunity to apologize in advance for any additional references which should be included). What is supposed to be useful is the process of identifying a certain collection of problems, and some suggestions for solutions, with a certain philosophy in mind. The diverse collection of workers in this field provides a diverse collection of philosophical perspectives, driving our perception of problems as well as the choice of solutions. Thus it seems like a valid and useful task to set out how things look from a given philosophical point of view. Our perspective can be summed up by saying that we would like to formalize, as quickly and easily as possible, the largest amount of standard mathematics, with the ultimate goal of getting to a point where it is concievable to formalize current research mathematics in any of the standard fields. This is a good moment to point out that one should not wish that everybody share the same point of view, or even anything close. On the contrary, it is good to have the widest possible variety of questions and answers, and this is only obtained by starting with the widest possible variety of philosophies.
We can now discuss the difference between what we might call 'standard' mathematical practice, and other currents which might be diversely labelled intuitionist, 'constructivist' or 'nonstandard'. In standard practice, mathematicians feel free to use whatever system of axioms they happen to have learned about and which they think is currently not known to be contradictory. This can even involve mixing and matching from among several axiom systems, or employing reasoning whose axiomatic basis is not fully clear but which the mathematician feels could be fit into one or another axiomatic system if necessary. This practice must be viewed in light of the role of proof as validation of ideas: for the standard mathematician the ideas in question have little, if anything, to do with logical foundations, and the mathematician seeks proof results for validation -it is clear that any generally accepted framework will be adequate for this task.
A growing number of people are interested in doing mathematics within an intuitionist or constructive framework. They tend to be closest to mathematical logic and computer programming, which may be why many current computer-proving tools are to some degree explicitly designed with these concerns in mind. There are many motivations for this, the principal one being deeply philosophical. Another is just concern about consistency -you never know if somebody might come up with an inconsistency in any given axiomatic system (see [40] , for example). Common sense suggests that if you take a system with less axioms, there is less chance of it, so it is possible to feel 'safer' doing mathematics with not too many axioms. A subtler motivation is the question of knowing what is the minimal axiomatic system under which a given result can be proven, see [73] for example. Computer scientists have some wonderful toys which make it possible directly to transform a constructive proof into a computational algorithm.
